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Abstract—In recent years, we have been experiencing fast pro-
liferation of different types of ransomware targeting home
users, companies and even critical telecommunications in-
frastructure elements. Modern day ransomware relies on
sophisticated infection, persistence and recovery prevention
mechanisms. Some recent examples that received significant
attention include WannaCry, Petya and BadRabbit. To de-
sign and develop appropriate defense mechanisms, it is im-
portant to understand the characteristics and the behavior of
different types of ransomware. Dynamic analysis techniques
are typically used to achieve that purpose, where the mali-
cious binaries are executed in a controlled environment and
are then observed. In this work, the dynamic analysis re-
sults focusing on the infamous WannaCry ransomware are
presented. In particular, WannaCry is examined, during its
execution in a purpose-built virtual lab environment, in order
to analyze its infection, persistence, recovery prevention and
propagation mechanisms. The results obtained may be used
for developing appropriate detection and defense solutions
for WannaCry and other ransomware families that exhibit
similar behaviors.
Keywords—dynamic malware analysis, ransomware, WannaCry.
1. Introduction
Ransomware threat is currently considered to be the main
moneymaking scheme for cyber criminals and the key threat
to Internet users [1], [2]. In recent years, the appearance of
new types of ransomware has been observed, combining the
use of worm-like spreading mechanisms and advanced re-
covery prevention schemes. Recent examples include Wan-
naCry [3], [4] and Petya [5], [6], which exploit the weak-
nesses of Microsoft Windows, as well as BadRabbit [7],
which spreads via insecure compromised websites.
From the defense perspective, the design of new counter-
measures is considered, in addition to traditional security
approaches, an important and trending task in this field.
Such a design, however, requires a comprehensive analysis
of ransomware functionality and behavior. This typically
involves a wide range of malware analysis tools and tech-
niques. Such techniques may be broadly classified as static
and dynamic. Static analysis is performed without execut-
ing the malicious binary, while dynamic analysis involves
executing the binary in an isolated environment.
In one of our previous works [8], we performed an initial
static and dynamic analysis of WannaCry to identify its re-
sources and functions, as well as its use of dynamic-link
libraries (DLLs) and communication protocols. In this
work, we have performed a comprehensive dynamic anal-
ysis, focusing on WannaCry’s infection, persistence, re-
covery prevention and propagation mechanisms. The tech-
niques presented are also applicable in the cases of other
ransomware families whose characteristics are similar to
that of WannaCry, such as worm-spreading mechanisms
and public-key based encryption. In particular, the research
presented examines WannaCry’s behavior during its execu-
tion in a safe, purpose-built virtual lab environment at the
University of York. The results obtained may form a basis
for designing and developing effective ransomware defense
solutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we present the relevant background information on ran-
somware in general and on WannaCry in particular. In
Section 3, the main findings from the dynamic analysis
of WannaCry we have performed, including its encryption
process, recovery prevention and propagation mechanisms,
are presented. Finally, Section 4 draws conclusions and
discusses potential future directions.
2. Background
2.1. Ransomware
Ransomware is a type of malicious software (malware) that
prevents users from accessing or limits their access to the
system or files, either by locking the screen or by encrypting
files, until a ransom is paid [9]. In most cases, ransomware
leaves the user with very few options, such as only allowing
the victim to communicate with the attacker and pay the
ransom.
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The most common types of ransomware use some form of
encryption, including both symmetric and public-key based
encryption schemes. Ransomware that relies on public-
key encryption is particularly difficult to mitigate, since
the encryption keys are stored in a remote command and
control (C&C) server. There is usually a time limit for
ransom to be paid, the users are provided with a special
website to purchase cryptocurrency (e.g. Bitcoins) and step-
by-step instructions on how to pay the ransom.
The lifecycle of modern day ransomware typically consists
of the following steps [10]: distribution, infection, C&C
communications, file search, file encryption and ransom
demand.
2.2. WannaCry
WannaCry ransomware (also known as Wana Decrypt0r,
WCry, WannaCry, WannaCrypt, and WanaCrypt0r) was ob-
served during a massive attack across multiple countries on
12 May 2017 [11]. According to multiple reports from se-
curity vendors, the total of 300,000 systems in over 150
countries had been severely damaged. The attack affected
a wide range of sectors, including healthcare, government,
telecommunications and gas/oil production.
The difficulty in protecting against WannaCry stems from
its ability to spread to other systems by using a worm com-
ponent. This feature makes the attacks more effective and
requires defense mechanisms that can react quickly and in
real time. Furthermore, WannaCry has an encryption com-
ponent that is based on public-key cryptography.
During the infection phase, WannaCry uses the Eternal-
Blue and DoublePulsar exploits that were allegedly leaked
in April 2017 by a group called The Shadow Brokers. Eter-
nalBlue exploits the server message block (SMB) vulnera-
bility that was patched by Microsoft on March 14, 2017 and
has been described in the security bulletin MS17-010 [12].
This vulnerability allows the adversaries to execute a re-
mote code on the infected machines by sending specially
crafted messages to an SMB v1 server, connecting to TCP
ports 139 and 445 of unpatched Windows systems. In par-
ticular, this vulnerability affects all unpatched Windows ver-
sions starting from Windows XP to Windows 8.1, except
for Windows 10.
DoublePulsar is a persistent backdoor that may be used to
access and execute code on previously compromised sys-
tems, thus allowing the attackers to install additional mal-
ware on the system. During the distribution process, Wan-
naCry’s worm component uses EternalBlue for initial in-
fection through the SMB vulnerability, by actively probing
appropriate TCP ports and, if successful, tries to implant
the DoublePulsar backdoor on the infected systems.
3. WannaCry Analysis
In this section, we present our findings based on the dy-
namic analysis of WannaCry we have performed. Samples
of WannaCry were obtained from VirusShare [13]. Two
executable files were analyzed: the worm component and
the encryption component (Table 1).
Table 1
WannaCry components
Worm component
MD5 db349b97c37d22f5ea1d1841e3c89eb4
SHA1
e889544aff85ffaf8b0d0da705105dee7c
97fe26
SHA256
24d004a104d4d54034dbcffc2a4b19a11
f39008a575aa614ea04703480b1022c
File type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386,
for MS Windows
Encryption component
MD5 84c82835a5d21bbcf75a61706d8ab549
SHA1
5ff465afaabcbf0150d1a3ab2c2e74f3a4
426467
SHA256
ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071
661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa
File type
PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386,
for MS Windows
3.1. Testbed
In order to analyze WannaCry, a virtual testbed shown in
Fig. 1 was built. The characteristics of the host machine
are as follows: Intel Core i7-4700MQ 2.40 GHz and 16 GB
RAM. The host machine acts as a virtual switch and is run-
ning REMnux [14], which is a free Linux toolkit for reverse
engineering and malware analysis. Two virtual machines
(VMs), running Windows 7 SP1, were used. The first VM
was infected with WannaCry, whereas the other VM was
clean. A custom network VMnet 5 – 192.168.180.0/24 was
created with the Virtual Network Editor option in VMWare
hypervisor. This testbed allows observing domain name
system (DNS) queries made by WannaCry during the in-
fection and replication process across internal and external
Fig. 1. Testbed for dynamic WannaCry analysis.
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networks via port 445 of the SMB v1 protocol. The REM-
nux machine acts as a DNS and HTTP server, and is able
to intercept all network communications using Wireshark.
DNS and HTTP services in REMnux were enabled using
FakeDNS and HTTP Daemon utilities, respectively.
The system level actions performed by WannaCry were ob-
served on the infected Windows 7 SP1 machine with the
192.168.180.130 IP address. In order to observe and report
the actions that WannaCry took while running on the sys-
tem, the SysAnalyzer tool [15] was used. The main benefit
of SysAnalyzer is that it is capable of taking system snap-
shots before and after malware execution, thus making it
possible to inspect system attributes, such as running pro-
cesses, open ports, DLLs loaded, registry key changes, run
time file modifications, scheduled tasks, mutual exclusion
objects (mutexes) and network connections. SysAnalyzer is
also capable of taking memory dumps and scanning them
for specific regular expressions. Before executing the Wan-
naCry sample on the infected machine, the SysAnalyzer’s
configuration wizard was set to apply a 120 s delay be-
tween system snapshots, thus allowing to inspect all system
attribute changes.
3.2. Libraries and Functions
Analysis performed with the Pestudio tool [16] revealed
that the worm and the encryption components of WannaCry
Table 2
DLLs of the worm component
Library Imports Description
ws2 32.dll 13
Windows Socket 2.0 32-bit
DLL
iphlpapi.dll 2 IP Helper API
wininet.dll 3 Internet Extensions for Win32
kernel32.dll 32
Windows NT Base API
Client DLL
advapi32.dll 11
Advanced Windows 32 Base
API
msvcp60.dll 2
Windows NT C++ Runtime
Library DLL
msvcrt.dll 28 Windows NT CRT DLL
Table 3
DLLs of the encryption component
Library Imports Description
kernel32.dll 54
Windows NT Base API
Client DLL
advapi32.dll 10
Advanced Windows 32 Base
API
user32.dll 1
Multi-User Windows User
API Client DLL
msvcrt.dll 49 Windows NT CRT DLL
contain DLLs shown in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. During
its execution, the worm component invokes iphlpapi.dll to
retrieve network configuration settings for the infected host.
Kernel32.dll and msvcrt.dll are the two libraries most fre-
quently invoked by the encryption component. This may
indicate that the main encryption functionality was im-
plemented by these two malicious libraries. To confirm
this, the imported functions of the libraries needed to be
examined.
Table 4
Functions of the encryption component
Function Location
GetCurrentThread 0xa53a
GetStartupInfoA 0xa97a
StartServiceCtrDispatcherA 0xa6f6
RegisterServiceCtrDispatcherA 0xa6d8
CreateServiceA 0xa688
StartServiceA 0xa662
CryptGenRandom 0xa650
CryptAcquireContextA 0xa638
OpenServiceA 0xa714
GetAdaptersInfo 0xa792
InternetOpenUrlA 0xa7c8
Table 5
Functions of the encryption component
Function Location
OpenMutexA 0xda84
GetComputerNameW 0xd8b2
CreateServiceA 0xdc2a
OpenServiceA 0xdc62
StartServiceA 0xdc52
CryptReleaseContext 0xdc14
RegCreateKeyW 0xdc04
fopen 0xdcd4
fread 0xdccc
fwrite 0xdcc2
fclose 0xdcb8
CreateFileA 0xd922
ReadFile 0xd964
The imported functions of the samples were observed by
Pestudio. The most suspicious functions identified among
them are shown in Tables 4 and 5. One may observe that
in general, WannaCry uses Microsoft’s crypto, file manage-
ment and C runtime file APIs. The crypto API library is
used to generate and manage random symmetric and asym-
metric cryptographic keys.
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Fig. 2. FakeDNS capture of the malicious DNS request.
Fig. 3. Wireshark capture of the malicious DNS request.
3.3. Initial Interactions
The dynamic analysis conducted has revealed that, upon
startup, the worm component tries to connect to the fol-
lowing domain, using the InternetOpenUrl function:
www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
The aforementioned domain is a kill-switch domain. This
means that if the domain is active, the worm component
stops running. On the other hand, if the worm component
cannot establish a connection with this domain (e.g. if the
domain is not active or if there is no connectivity), it con-
tinues to run and registers itself as a “Microsoft Security
Center (2.0) Service” mssecsvs2.0 process on the infected
machine. Hence, this kill-switch domain may be used as
part of a detection technique when developing a defense
system.
The FakeDNS utility at REMnux captures the malicious
DNS request on port 80 (Fig. 2), while Wireshark shows
(Fig. 3) the DNS packet query field from the infected ma-
chine (IP 192.168.180.130) to the DNS server on REMnux
(IP 192.168.180.128).
3.4. Persistence Mechanisms
After connection failure with the kill-switch domain, the
worm component attempts to create a mssecsvs2.0 pro-
cess with the DisplayName of “Microsoft Security Center
(2.0) Service”. This can be observed in the Process Hacker
tool with 4016 PID, indicating that the service has been
launched (Fig. 4). In addition to this, the worm compo-
nent of WannaCry extracts the hardcoded R resource bi-
nary and then copies it to “C:\Windows\taskche.exe” di-
rectory path. The R resource represents the binary of the
WannaCry encryption component. After that, the worm
runs the executable with the following parameters in the
command line: “C:\Windows\taskche.exe/i”. Next, the
worm tries to move the “C:\Windows\taskche.exe” file to
“C:\Windows\qeriuwjhrf”, to replace the original file if it
exists. This is done to ensure multiple infections and avoid
any issues with creating the tasksche.exe process.
Fig. 4. Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service.
Finally, WannaCry creates an entry in the Windows reg-
istry in order to ensure that it runs every time the
computer is restarted. The new entry contains a string
(e.g. “midtxzggq900”), which is a unique identifier ran-
domly generated by using the computer name. Once the
tasksche.exe component runs, it copies itself to a folder
with a randomly generated name in the Common Appdata
directory of the infected machine. Then, it attempts to es-
tablish memory persistence by adding itself to the AutoRun
feature.
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Fig. 5. WannaCry dropped files to the working directory.
Fig. 6. WannaCry extortion message.
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In summary, the dynamic analysis has revealed that, to
achieve persistence on the infected machine, WannaCry per-
forms the following actions:
• creates an entry in the Windows registry to ensure
that it executes every time the machine is restarted,
• attempts to achieve memory persistence by adding
itself to the AutoRun feature of Windows,
• uses Windows icacls command to grant itself a full
access to all files on the machine,
• deletes all backup (shadow) copies and tries to pre-
vent being booted in safe mode by executing several
commands in the Windows command line,
• deletes all backup folders,
• by using the Windows command line, creates a
VBScript program which generates a single shortcut
of the @WanaDecryptor@.exe decrypter file,
• tries to kill SQL and MS Exchange database pro-
cesses by executing several commands in the Win-
dows command line.
3.5. Configuration Data Load
After the persistence phase, WannaCry loads the XIA re-
source, which corresponds to a password protected ZIP file.
It decompresses the files and drops them to the working di-
rectory of the running process (Fig. 5), as observed in the
DirWatch module of SysAnalyzer.
As one can see, WannaCry loads configuration data from
the c.wnry file into memory. WannaCry randomly chooses
one of the three available Bitcoin addresses and then writes
this address back to the configuration data. This is done
in order to display the payment address in the extortion
message (Fig. 6). After that, WannaCry sets the hidden
attribute (Fig. 7) for the working directory with the help
of the CreateProcess function. Next, with the help of the
Windows icacls command, WannaCry grants full access to
all files on the target system (Fig. 8).
Fig. 7. WannaCry sets the hidden attribute for the working
directory.
Fig. 8. WannaCry grants full access on the target system.
The next step is to import one of the hardcoded public RSA
keys as was identified at offset 0xec00 of the tasksche.exe
process (Fig. 9). WannaCry then loads and executes, in
memory, the contents of the t.wnry file (Fig. 10) which
contains the default encrypted AES key required for de-
crypting the DLL responsible for the file encryption rou-
tine. The first 8 bytes of the file are checked to match the
WANACRY! string. Then, the imported public RSA key
hardcoded within binary is used to decrypt the AES key
stored at the beginning of the t.wnry file. The AES key
obtained is then used to decrypt and load the encryption
DLL, which can be observed with the help of OllyDbg de-
bugging tool [17] during WannaCry execution, as shown in
Fig. 11. This DLL is responsible for file encryption on the
infected machine and is summarized in Table 6.
Table 6
Encryption DLL
MD5 f351e1fcca0c4ea05fc44d15a17f8b36
SHA1
7d36a6aa8cb6b504ee9213c200c831e
b8d4ef26b
Size 65536 bytes
File type Dynamic-Link-Library
Internal name kbdlv.dll
File description Latvia keyboard layout
Timestamp Mon, Jul 13 18:12:55 2009
3.6. Encryption Process
The encryption component of WannaCry is invoked with
the TaskStart system thread. During its execution, the en-
cryption component checks if one of the following mutexes
exists:
GlobalnMsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA,
GlobalnMsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexW,
MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA.
If the mutex “MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA” is
present, then the encryption component automatically stops
without taking any further action. If the mutex is not
present on the system, the encryption process starts. In
particular, TaskStart creates a new mutex named “MsWin-
ZonesCacheCounterMutexA” and reads the contents of the
c.wnry file from the current directory. After that, Wan-
naCry creates three configuration files shown in Table 7.
Table 7
WannaCry configuration files
Filename Description
00000000.res TOR/C2 info
00000000.pky Public RSA key
00000000.eky Encrypted private RSA key
After the configuration files have been created, the encryp-
tion component is ready to start encrypting files on the sys-
tem. To accomplish this, it spawns several threads. First,
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Fig. 9. Imported RSA private key.
Fig. 10. Loaded and executed t.wnry file.
Fig. 11. Decrypted AES key in a memory dump.
WannaCry attempts to load and check the existence of two
keys in the 00000000.pky and 00000000.dky files. The
00000000.dky file presents a decryption RSA key which
is received upon the payment has been verified. When the
victim clicks the “Check Payment” button, WannaCry starts
checking for the presence of the 00000000.dky file on the
system. If the two aforementioned files do not exist, Wan-
naCry generates a new unique RSA 2048-bit asymmetric
key pair, which can be seen in the memory dump made
with with SysAnalyzer tool at 0x2B3795 offset (Fig. 12).
Fig. 12. Generation of an RSA key pair.
Once the key pair has been generated, WannaCry exports
the victim’s public RSA key to a 00000000.pky file using
Microsoft’s CryptExportKey function. Next, WannaCry ex-
ports the victim’s private RSA key and encrypts it with
another hard-coded RSA public key. The encrypted pri-
vate key is stored as a 00000000.eky file. After the key
has been safely stored, WannaCry calls upon the CryptDe-
stroyKey function to destroy the private key in memory, to
limit any key recovery options.
Next, WannaCry starts enumerating, every 3 seconds, in-
formation about all logical drives attached to the system.
If a new attached drive is not a CD ROM drive, then it be-
gins the encryption process on the new drive. At this stage,
WannaCry also starts iterating through all existing directo-
ries and searching for predefined file extensions of interest.
To encrypt each file, it generates a 16-byte symmetric AES
key using the CryptGenRandom function. Then, it encrypts
every generated AES key with the public RSA key and
stores it inside the file header starting with the WANACRY!
string value. Encrypted files are renamed and appended
with the .WNCRY file extension.
Fig. 13. Password for a ZIP archive in the encryption component.
The encryption component contains a password-protected
ZIP archive. We managed to obtain the password, “WN-
cry@2ol7”, by disassembling the encrypter with the IDA
Pro tool [18] (see Fig. 13). The contents of the ZIP archive
are summarized in Table 8 and described below:
• msg is a folder that contains a list of rich text format
(RTF) files with the wnry extension. These files are
the readme instructions used to show the extortion
message to the victim in different languages, based
on the information obtained from the system by ma-
licious WannaCry functions;
• b.wnry is an image file used for displaying instruc-
tions for the decryption of user files. It starts with 42
4D strings, which indicates that this file is a bitmap
image;
• c.wnry contains a list of Tor addresses with the .onion
extension and a link to a zipped installation file of
the Tor browser from Tor Project [19];
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Table 8
Files in the password protected ZIP archive
Name Size [bytes] Modified
msg 1,329,657 2017-05-11
b.wnry 1,440,054 2017-05-11
c.wnry 780 2017-05-11
r.wnry 864 2017-05-10
s.wnry 3,038,286 2017-05-09
t.wnry 65,816 2017-05-11
taskdl.exe 20,480 2017-05-11
taskse.exe 20,480 2017-05-11
u.wnry 245,760 2017-05-11
• r.wnry is a text file in English with additional de-
cryption instructions to be used by the decryption
component (the u.wnry file mentioned below);
• s.wnry file is a ZIP archive (HEX signature 50 4B 03
04) which contains the Tor software executable. This
executable has been obtained with the assistance of
the WinHex tool [20] by saving raw binary data with
the .zip extension;
• t.wnry is an encrypted file with the WANACRY!
encryption format. The file header starts with the
WANACRY! string;
• taskdl.exe is a supporting tool for the deletion of
files with the .WNCRY extension. By observing the
properties of the file, the following masquerade de-
scription can be found: “SQL Client Configuration
Utility”;
• taskse.exe is a supporting tool for malware execu-
tion on remote desktop protocol (RDP) sessions. The
following file description was identified: “waitfor –
wait/send a signal over a network”;
• u.wnry is an executable file (HEX signature 4D 5A)
with the name of “@WanaDecryptor@.exe”, which
represents the decryption component of WannaCry.
At the same time, another thread calls the taskse.exe process
every 30 s, which tries to enumerate active RDP sessions on
connected remote machines and to run the @WanaDecryp-
tor@.exe binary file. This file is extracted from the u.wnry
file and represents the decryption component of WannaCry.
The persistence of RDP session injections is ensured by
adding the value in the AutoRun registry key.
3.7. Recovery Prevention
After finishing the encryption process, WannaCry tries to
prevent various common data recovery methods by exe-
cuting several commands on the system. To prevent data
recovery, WannaCry executes the following commands:
• vssadmin delete shadows/all/quiet. Deletes all the
shadow volumes on the system without alerting the
user. By default, these volumes contain backup data
in the event of a system fault;
• wmic shadowcopy delete. Ensures deletion of any
copies relevant to shadow volumes;
• bcdedit/set default bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures.
Ensures that the machine is booted, even if errors are
found;
• bcdedit/set default recoveryenabled no. Disables the
Windows recovery feature, thus preventing the vic-
tims from the possibility to reverting their system to
a previous build;
• wbadmin delete catalog −q. Ensures that victim can
no longer use any backup files created by Windows
Server.
3.8. Propagation
The worm component of WannaCry carries the main prop-
agation and exploit functionality, which utilizes the Eter-
nalBlue exploit and the DoublePulsar backdoor to leverage
the MS17-010 SMB vulnerability [12]. After performing
the initial interactions and checking connectivity with the
kill-switch domain, the worm functionality is established by
initiating the mssecsvs2.0 service, which WannaCry installs
after being executed. This service tries to spread WannaCry
payload through the SMB vulnerability on any vulnerable
systems on both internal and external networks.
In order to perform this, WannaCry creates and spawns
two separate threads that simultaneously replicate worm
payload in all detected networks. In the internal network,
before starting the propagation process, the component ob-
tains the IP addresses of local network interfaces by in-
voking the GetAdaptersInfo function, and determines the
subnets existing in the network.
After that, the worm component tries to connect to all
possible IP addresses in any available local network on
port 445, which is the default port for SMB over IP
service. If successful, the worm attempts to exploit the
service for the MS17-010 vulnerability. In our testbed,
connection attempts were observed with Wireshark on
a REMnux machine, when the infected machine (IP
192.168.180.130) sent SMB probe packets to the clean ma-
chine (IP 192.168.180.134), as shown in Fig. 14.
During the SMB probing, one of the unique features of
the generated traffic is that it contains two hardcoded IP
addresses: 192.168.56.20 and 172.16.99.5. They can be
observed by extracting strings from the binary. In particu-
lar, WannaCry sends three NetBIOS session setup packets,
where two of them contain the aforementioned hardcoded
IP addresses.
At the same time, the worm component attempts to spread
across the external networks by generating various IP ad-
dresses and by trying to connect to TCP port 445. This
can be observed with Wireshark on REMnux, as shown
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Fig. 14. WannaCry internal network traffic attempting the SMB exploit.
Fig. 15. WannaCry external network traffic attempting the SMB exploit.
in Fig. 15. As it can be seen, the worm attempts to probe
external Internet IP addresses for the MS17-010 vulnera-
bility. This explains the reason for the widespread infec-
Table 9
External IP addresses generated
by WannaCry
IP address : port
109.140.223.210 : 445
206.242.244.156 : 445
52.213.90.240 : 445
202.76.26.154 : 445
205.215.5.24 : 445
80.133.73.130 : 445
198.73.58.205 : 445
40.188.28.244 : 445
184.55.110.103 : 445
tion seen during the massive outbreak on 12 May 2017.
The full list of WannaCry generated IP addresses obtained
during the analysis is presented in Table 9.
3.9. C&C Communication
During its execution, the software also tries to contact
the C&C servers. To this end, WannaCry unpacked
and dropped files from the s.wnry file, containing the
Tor executable, into the installation directory as shown
Fig. 16. Tor executable dropped into the installation directory.
in Fig. 16. Before unpacking, it starts listening on the
localhost address 127.0.0.1:9050. This address, with the
specified 9050 port, is typically used for configuring the
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Tor browser application. If the contents of the s.wnry
file are corrupted, then WannaCry tries to download
the Tor executable from a hardcoded URL. After the
successful extraction of the Tor executable, it copies
“TaskData\Tor\tor.exe” to “TaskData\Tor\taskhsvc.exe”
and executes it. Next, WannaCry parses the contents of
the c.wnry file, which specifies the configuration data,
including the following .onion addresses to connect and
the zipped Tor browser installation file:
gx7ekbenv2riucmf.onion
57g7spgrzlojinas.onion
xxlvbrloxvriy2c5.onion
76jdd2ir2embyv47.onion
cwwnhwhlz52maqm7.onion
https://dist.torporject.org/torbrowser/6.5.1/tor
-win32-0.2.9.10.zip
After that, WannaCry sends the first eight bytes of the
00000000.res file content to the C&C server. These bytes
specify the host and user name of the infected machine.
The 00000000.res file, which is dropped during encryption
process, accumulates in total 88 bytes of configuration data,
including internal flags, counters, and timestamps.
During its communication with Tor addresses, WannaCry
establishes a secure HTTPS channel to port 443, and uses
common Tor ports, 9001 and 9050, for network traffic and
directory information.
4. Conclusions and Future Work
We have performed a comprehensive dynamic analysis of
WannaCry ransomware in a purpose-built virtual testbed.
We analyzed the WannaCry version which was observed
during the massive attacks on 12 May 2017. The analysis
has revealed that the given ransomware is composed of two
distinctive components, which enable the worm-like self-
propagating mechanism and combined encryption process.
Both worm and encryption components of WannaCry have
been examined.
The focus of this study was on WannaCry’s initial inter-
actions and the infection process, its persistence mech-
anism, encryption process, recovery prevention as well
as its propagation mechanisms and communication with
C&C servers. The analysis has revealed important char-
acteristics and behaviors of WannaCry during its execu-
tion. In particular, we identified Tor addresses used for
C&C, observed TCP and DNS connections, SMB probes,
as well as actions related to WannaCry persistence and
obfuscation.
The worm component of WannaCry weaponized by the
functionality enabling it to exploit and propagate via
Microsoft’s MS17-010 on unpatched systems by sending
SMB probing packets on port 445. In addition to the
modular nature of WannaCry, it was also observed that
it has embedded RSA keys used to decrypt the required
malicious DLL representing the encryption component. It
was identified that the worm component scans both in-
ternal and external networks for MS17-010 vulnerability,
by generating a list of local and global IP addresses. The
worm tries to probe the hosts from the generated list by
sending packets to port 445. Before its execution, Wan-
naCry also performs an initial check with the kill-switch
domain.
At the same time, the analysis has identified two hardcoded
IP addresses (192.168.56.20 and 172.16.99.5), which are
sent during the SMB probing. Depending on the condition
of the s.wnry file dropped during execution, WannaCry can
also communicate with embedded .onion addresses via a se-
cure channel on port 443 and via common Tor ports 900
and 9050 to download the Tor browser installation software
from a specified URL.
The findings of this work could be used for designing effec-
tive mitigation mechanisms for WannaCry and other ran-
somware families that exhibit similar behavior. This is left
as future work. In particular, we plan to investigate the
use of software-defining networking (SDN) [21], [22] for
ransomware detection and mitigation. SDN is an emerg-
ing paradigm of programmable networks that decouples the
control and data planes. SDN controllers maintain a view
of the entire network and implement policy decisions. On
the other hand, each device at the data plane maintains
one or more flow tables, where the packet handling rules
are stored. This changes the way that networks are de-
signed and managed, and enables new SDN-based security
solutions [23]–[25], such as firewalls and intrusion detec-
tion systems for various types of malware, including ran-
somware mitigation [26], [27].
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